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PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYER DRUG TESTING
PROGRAMS: HAS BIG BROTHER FINALLY
ARRIVED?
Drug abuse is a national concern.' The use of drugs, including alcohol, 2 controlled substances,3 and prescription medications,4 perme1. See Thomas, America' Crusade, TIMES, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60, for a general
discussion of the problem of drug abuse in America. See also Griffin, Schools Fail to
Scare, Teach or Bully Away Drugs, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 22, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 3,
for a discussion the pervasiveness of drugs in the schools.
2.
See generally B. WOLMAN, CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS: A
HANDBOOK 624-5 (1978). B. WOLMAN, THE THERAPIST'S HANDBOOK 443-50 (1976), for a
discussion of the symptomology and treatment of alcoholism.
3. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1970) describes the
criteria which place a substance on one of the five schedules.
In placing a drug or other substance on one of the schedules, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare must consider
eight factors:
1. The drug or other substance's actual or relative potential for abuse;
2. Scientific evidence of its known pharmacalogical effects, e.g., whether a
drug has a hallucinogenic effect;
3. The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance;
4. Its history and current patterns of abuse, including social, economic, and
ecological factors;
5. The scope, duration, and significance of abuse, e.g., whether it is widespread or a passing fad;
6. What, if any, risk there is to public health;
7. Its psychic or physiological dependence liability, i.e., whether the drug is
physically addictive or psychologically habit forming;
8. Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled. Id. § 811.
The most common drugs of abuse are divided into five categories: (1) narcotics,
(2) depressants, (3) stimulants, (4) hallucinogens, and (5) cannabis. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION DRUGS OF ABUSE,

11-53

(1986). The term narcotic usually refers to opium, opium deriviatives, or synthetic
substitutes. Id. at 12. Most narcotics have a medical use in the United States. Id.
Abusers build up tolerance for narcotics, requiring larger doses to obtain the desired effects. Id. Narcotics cause physical and psychological dependence. Id. When
the drug is no longer present in the body, withdrawal symptoms occur. Id. Initial
withdrawal symptoms, appearing eight to twelve hours after the last dose, are watery
eyes, runny nose, yawning and excessive perspiration. Id. As the withdrawal syndrome progresses, the individual experiences restlessness, irritability, goose flesh,
tremors, yawning, and severe sneezing. Id. The most severe symptoms are: a feeling of
weakness and possible suicidal depression, accompanied by nausea and vomiting,
stomach cramps and diarrhea, elevated heart rate and blood pressure, chills alternating with flushed skin and excessive sweating, pain in the bones, extremities and back
muscles, as well as muscle spasms and kicking movements. Id. The symptoms dissipate in seven to ten days. Id.
The second category of controlled substances consists of depressants. Id. When
taken as prescribed by a physician, depressants are a medically effective remedy for
relief of anxiety, tension and insomnia. Id. If taken in excess, depressants produce
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ates all aspects of the American culture.3 Drug dependence has
emerged as the dark side of the American character." Recent public
opinion polls indicate that before the summer of 1986 ended, the
problem of drug abuse surpassed economic problems and the threat
of war as the nation's number one concern.7 "The War on Drugs" is
a regular feature on television news stories and in newspaper headlines.8 America's recent preoccupation with drug abuse now centers
effects similar to the effects of alcohol. Id.
Like alcohol, depressants produce effects which vary from individual to individual and from time to time in the same person. Id. Abusers develop rapid tolerance,
which leads to physiological and psychological dependence. Id. Withdrawal from high
doses of depressants is a medical emergency more serious than that of any other drug
withdrawal. Id. The patient improves, however, after detoxification. Id. Within 24
hours after the last dose, minor withdrawal symptoms appear which include anxiety
and agitation, loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, increased heart rate, excessive
sweating, tremulousness, and stomach cramps. Id. The third category of controlled
substances is stimulants. Id. at 37. The two most common stimulants in our culture
are nicotine and caffeine. Id. Neither drug is a controlled substance. Id. More potent
stimulants are controlled, because of the risk of producing physical and psychological
dependence. Id. Taken in moderation, stimulants relieve fatique and increase alertness. Taken in higher doses, stimulants produce excitation, euphoria, increased heart
rate and blood pressure, insomnia, and loss of appetite. Id. The abuser rapidly develops tolerance to stimulants.
After immediate withdrawal from stimulants, the abuser experiences depression,
apathy, fatigue, and insomnia, up to 20 hours per day. Id. These symptoms may persist for several days. Id. Impaired perception, thought disorder, anxiety, and suicidal
ideation may persist for weeks or even months. Id. The fourth category of controlled
substances is hallucinogens. Natural and synthetic hallucinogens excite the nervous
system, distorting the perception of objective reality. Id. at 49. Large doses of hallucinogenic drugs produce delusions and visual hallucinations. Id. Depersonalization and
depression may occur, leading to suicidal ideation. Id.
Although no withdrawal syndrome has been documented, abusers frequently report fragmentary, recurrent episodes of the psychedelic effects. Id. These episodes are
called "flashbacks." Id. Hallucinogenics do not produce physical dependence. Id.
They can produce psychological dependence. Id.
The last category, cannabis, including marijuana and hashish, grows in most
tropical and temperate climates on earth. Id. at 45. Usually smoked, the effects are
felt within minutes and may last up to three hours. Id. Abusers report restlessness, a
sense of well-being, increased hunger, and increased sensory perception. Id. But see
Rhein, Here Comes PrescriptionPot, Bus. WK., June 25, 1985, at 109 (FDA licensed a
drug company to manufacture THC to combat nausea caused by cancer
chemotherapy).
4. Prescription medications are controlled substances prescribed by physicians.
See, e.g., COOLEY, FAMILY MEDICAL GUIDE, 894 (1973) (barbituates most commonly
prescribed controlled substance).
5. Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework,
11 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 422 (1985).
6. Thomas, supra note 1, at 60. The Chicago Tribune stated that 65% of children addicted to drugs or alcohol learned the habit from an older family member.
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 6. A study by the University of Michigan found that one-third of all children in the United States live in a home where an
older family member is a drug addict or alcoholic. Id.
7. Thomas, supra note 1, at 61. See also Page, From Apathy to Frenzied Activism, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 5, at 3, col. 3 (drug abuse at the top of the
national agenda after the cocaine related deaths of two famous athletes).
8. Thomas, supra note 1, at 61.
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upon the insidiousness of "crack" 9 and the perception that drugs
have spread into the workplace and into the neighborhood.'" There
is, however, disagreement concerning drug abuse. Some experts contend that drug use is declining or has at least stabilized for certain
drugs." One expert stated that the cocaine epidemic has peaked and
that the use of other drugs is declining significantly."5 This comment
discusses drug abuse in the workplace, and examines the implementation of drug tests and the drug testing industry. The comment
then addresses the constitutional issues involved when government
employers require their employees to take mandatory drug tests.
The comment discusses a fourteenth amendment issue involving the
determination of whether employees refusing to submit to drug
tests, or testing positive for controlled substances, are deprived of
due process of the law. In addition, a fourth amendment issue concerning whether a government employer's mass and random drug
testing constitutes an illegal search and seizure will be discussed.
The comment concludes with suggestions intended to balance a government employer's need for the implementation of a drug testing
program against an employee's constitutional rights.
9. Id. First imported from the Bahamas around 1983, crack is a highly potent
form of cocaine that can transform a pleasure seeker into an addict. Id. at 63. This
drug is cocaine, boiled down into chrystalline balls. Id. The cocaine makes a crackling
sound when heated. Id. The user then smokes the balls. Id. Many physicians believe
that cocaine is the most addictive popular drug existing, and crack is, by far, the most
addictive of all. Id. Negative side effects include depression and inability to sleep,
which can lead to deep depression and paranoia. Id.
10. It is estimated that 300,000 children and adolescents use drugs and alcohol
to the extent that it interferes with daily living. Griffin, Recognition First Step on
Long Road Back, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1986, § 1 at 1, 14 col. 3. The number of
patients under 18 years old who are admitted for drug abuse and alcoholism treatment in Illinois residential or outpatient programs increased from 3,804 in 1982 to
5,404 in 1985. Id.
11. Thomas, supra note 1, at 62. One agency believes that the peak rate of drug
usage occurred in the late 1970's. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
Increased peer pressure and a heightened awareness of the physical risks involved in
drug abuse contributed to the decline. Id. Furthermore, youthful problems dissipate
as the population ages and, therefore, drug abuse declines. Id.
The University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research conducted a survey of
16,000 seniors who graduated in June, 1985. In 1975, 9% of surveyed seniors had
tried cocaine. By 1985, 17.5% of seniors had tried it. Griffin, Drug Program Pulls a
Kid From the Brink, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1 at 10, col. 3. The survey
indicated that 92% have used alcohol. See also McNulty, Drug War Finds Enemy In
Retreat, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1 (decline in marijuana use
among high school seniors from 11% in 1978 to 5% in 1985).
12. Thomas, supra note 1, at 61. "The trend since 1979 is that people are backing off. In almost all classes of drugs, abuse among younger people has diminished.
When you get that kind of change in attitude on the part of youth, it's obvious that
drug use is going to decline." Id. at 62.
In 1978, ten percent of all high school seniors smoked marijuana every day. Id.
Currently the percentage is five. Id. Heroin is used by half a million people, which is
about the same number as 15 years ago. Id. Although 22 million Americans have tried
cocaine, 4.3 million are current users; a number which has remained constant since
1979. Id.
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DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE

Drugs have moved from the ghetto to the workplace."3 Drug
abuse on the job results in morale problems, injuries, illness, termination of employment and even death." Employers are concerned
with economic loss due to tardiness, absenteeism, property damage,
lost productivity, quality-control problems, increased health insurance costs, increased worker's compensation costs, employee theft,
and costs related to replacing terminated employees and training
new ones.' 5 Employee drug abuse costs the American economy an
estimated $25 billion annually in lost productivity." The government estimates the economic costs from lost productivity, absenteeism, and higher accident rates at $33 billion annually.' 7 In controlling drug abuse, employers have traditionally imposed disciplinary
measures on employees who are convicted of drug-related crimes or
who are visibly intoxicated while on duty." Seeking more effective
measures, many employers recently shifted emphasis from traditional disciplinary measures to preventive detection of employee
substance abuse.' 9 Employers found that disciplining employees after serious problems arise does not sufficiently protect economic or
20
societal interests.

Private business and governmental agencies are increasingly initiating employee drug testing programs. 2 1 In the last four years, the
13. Id.
14. Id. See Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Workplace: Balancing Employer and Employee and Rights; 11 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 181 (1985).
15. Geidt, supra note 14, at 181.
16. See How Drugs Sap the Nation's Strength, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
May 16, 1983, 55, (drug abuse costs the economy $25 billion annually due to slowed
productivity, absenteeism and irrational decisions); Taking Drugs on the Job, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, 55, 55 (economic costs due to lost productivity, medical expenses
and crime are 25.8 billion annually).
17. Thomas, supra note 1, at 63.
18. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 422.
19. Id. In the military, before mass drug testing, 27% of 20,000 personnel admitted that they had used drugs during the previous 30 days. Battle Strategies,TIME,
Sept. 15, 1986, at 69. [hereinafter Battle Strategies]. In 1985, the figure dropped to
9%. Id. In the civilian sector, 72% of individuals surveyed in a recent New York
Times/CBS News poll stated that they would be willing to be tested. Id.
20. Battle Strategies, supra note 19, at 69. See Englade, Who's Hired and
Who's Fired, 114 STUDENT LAWYER, Apr. 1986, 20, 22 (drug abusers have three and
one half times as many accidents on the job, this costs employers three times as much
in medical benefits).
21. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 62; Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423. Englade,
supra note 20, at 22. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) announced a drug testing program where some athletes will be tested because they finished with high scores, played the most time or won events. Chicago Tribune, Sept.
25, 1986, § 4, at 1, col. 5. Other athletes will be tested at random. Id. Officials will
conduct the tests both before and after athletic events. Id. For example, before and
after each football bowl game, officials will test a total of 36 players: 22 with the most
playing time and 14 selected at random. Id. If a player is found to have used banned
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implementation of employee drug screening programs increased dramatically.22 Some experts predict that within five years, drug screen2
ing will be a prerequisite for obtaining any type of employment.

Although the economic consequences of alcohol abuse are much
greater, 4 employers have focused upon the detection of illicit drug
usage. 25 The two most popular drug screening programs implemented are mass programs and random programs.26 A mass drug

screening program is one where all employees are tested, regardless
drugs, such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or anabolic steriods, the team's win will be
vacated. Id.
22. Chapman, The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at
57-58; Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423; Englade, supra note 21, at 22. Thomas, supra
note 1, at 62. In 1982, ten percent of Fortune 500 companies used drug screening
urinalysis for job applicants and employees. Chapman, supra, at 57. By 1985, twentyfive percent of the companies used testing. Id. Currently, approximately one-third of
the Fortune 500 companies require drug screening for applicants and employees.
Thomas, supra note 1, at 62.
23. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423.
24. Employers are increasingly utilizing novel investigative techniques in order
to detect and control employee substance abuse. In addition to blood and urine tests,
such techniques include polygraph administration, random searches, video surveillance, undercover personnel, and trained dogs. See, e.g., Taking Drugs on the Job,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 52-60; Getting In Touch on Worker Abuse of Drugs and
Alcohol, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 5, 1983, at 85.
In examining the issue of employee substance abuse, research indicates that most
on-the-job fatalities and injuries are alcohol related. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986,
§ 5, at 1, 4, col. 1. Alcohol related accidents are greater in frequency than accidents
related to all illicit substances combined. Id. Despite the statistics, employers have
focused their efforts upon detection of employees' illicit drug usage. Alcohol, combined with another drug, was the most frequently identified drug emergency cited in
hospital emergency room cases. Id.
In 1985, New York City officially reported 137 cocaine-related deaths, out of 670
drug-related deaths. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 5, at 1, 4 col. 1. In 1985, 563
people died from cocaine abuse. Id. The Chicago Tribune reported 613 cocaine related deaths. This number is minute compared with the 98,186 deaths attributed to
alcohol in 1980, and the 300,000 attributed to tobacco annually. National Center for
Health Statistics study stated the 1983 health care costs for drug abuse were $59.7
billion while alcohol abuse costs were $116.7 billion. Thomas, supra note 1, at 64;
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 21, 1986, § 5, at 1, 4 col. 1.
25. Id. In Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), the public-sector employer instituted a urinalysis drug testing program in the
following circumstances: (1) following an extended absence or suspension; (2) as part
of a routine, periodic physical examination; (3) as part of a physical examination for
promotion; (4) when directed by a supervisor or manager following an incident that
occurs while on duty; (5) at any time, if a controlled substance was identified in a
prior test and (6) when a supervisor or manager has reason to believe that an employee is impaired as a result of drug use. Id. at 599.
Employees have challenged the program on fourth amendment, privacy, and due
process grounds. Id. at 600. The court has not decided the merits of this case. Id. The
purpose of this proceeding was a motion to intervene. Id. The court found that the
class contained a number of subclasses which were either drug users or non-drug
users. Id. at 602. The court held that no class representation can adequately represent claims of the subclass and allowed the employee who was suspended to intervene. Id. at 603, 608.
26. See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423. See also Rust, Drug Testing: The Legal
Dilemma, 72 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (1986) for a discussion of mass and random drug tests.
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of their job classification. 7 A random drug screening program is one
in which certain employees are randomly selected to submit urine

samples.28
Mass and random drug screening programs are popular for
three reasons. First, controlled substance metabolites can be detected in the body for a much longer period of time than alcohol
metabolites.19 Government employers, therefore, can more readily
detect employee drug abuse, as opposed to employee alcohol abuse.30
Second, possession of a controlled substance is illegal.3" Third, the
social stigma attached to drug use is greater than the social stigma
attached to alcohol use. 2 Employers argue that the consequences of
on-the-job substance abuse are so severe that they justify intrusion
33
into the employee's constitutionally protected privacy interests.
When considering certain job classifications for drug screening, employers argue that the law should favor public safety. 4 Employers
further contend that individual privacy interests do not outweigh
public safety interests.3 5
In the face of rising employee concern, legal challenges, and increasing controversy surrounding the introduction of drug testing
programs, one prominent expert 38 has attempted to reconcile both
27. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423.
28. Id.
29. Id. Controlled substance metabolites are organic compounds stored in body
fat and eliminated through the urine. Id.
30. Cannabinoid metabolites can be detected in the urine within one hour after
ingestion. See Schwartz and Flawks, Laboratory Detection of Marijuana Use, 254
J.A.M.A. 788, 788-89 (1985). The concentration level falls below detectable levels
within two to five days. Id. at 788-89. Concentration levels, however, may remain high
enough to be detected for up to 10 days after ingestion. Id. at 789. See also HayesAlbion Corp. 76 LAB. ARB. 1005 (1981) (Kahn, Arb.); Gen. Felt Indus., Inc., 74 LAB.
ARB. 972 (1979) (Carnes, Arb.). See generally Geidt, supra note 14, at 1969, for a
discussion of cases where arbitrators upheld employer disciplinary measures against
employees who drank on the job, reported to work intoxicated, or allowed work attendance or job performance to suffer as a result of alcohol problems.
31. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 423.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 433; Lehr and Middlebrooks, Workplace Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Policies, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 407, 407-12 (1985); infra notes 91-150
and accompanying text.
34. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 425.
35. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text,
36. Mark Rothstein is a professor of law and adjunct professor of medicine at
West Virginia University. See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 422. Rothstein argues that
adoption of his criterion consists of a rational compromise between two extreme
views. Id. at 425. One extreme is those people who believe all workers should be
screened because (1) illicit substance abuse is illegal and could lead to an arrest; (2)
an employee's need for extra money to purchase drugs may cause that employee to
engage in crime, such as theft; (3) drug screening deters employee substance abuse.
Id.
The other extreme consists of those people who believe that no worker should be
screened. Id. at 425-26. This belief is justified on privacy grounds. See infra notes
74-87 and accompanying text. These individuals assert that employees have constitu-
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employer and employee concerns.17 When deciding whether to introduce a drug screening program, the employers' need for drug screening outweighs the individual employee's privacy interests 8 if intoxicated employees pose a substantial danger3 to themselves, to others,
or to property while on duty.

II.

DRUG TESTS AND THE TESTING INDUSTRY

The general public's concern with drug abuse and the publicsector employer's concern with protecting public safety are only two
factors accounting for the rapid expansion of the drug testing industry today.' 0 Another factor is the drug testing industry's introduction of fast and inexpensive drug tests." Test manufacturers market
their testing products as portable, fast, cheap and accurate."2 Critics,
tionally protected interest in their bodily fluids. Id. Employees posses a reasonable
and legitimate expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids. Id. Government employers, therefore, cannot intrude upon this privacy interest without violating the employee's fourth amendment rights. Id.
37. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 425.
38. Id.
39. Substantial danger criterion allows employers to discipline or discharge any
employee in any job classification who is intoxicated, suspected of being intoxicated,
or is involved in an accident and shows a positive result after a drug screen. Id. For
example, a drug screening program may be appropriate for airline pilots but not for
clerical workers. Id. Employers should routinely screen employees in "critical" or
"safety specific" job classifications. Id. Employers, however, should not test employees in other job classifications where employees do not pose a threat to public safety.
Id.
40. Drug testing has become a $100 million a year business. Chapman, The
Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, August 19, 1985, at 57, 62. An estimated $73
million was expended in the world-wide drug testing market in 1985. Sellers, positive
Results For Drug Test Sales, INSIGHT, Jan. 12, 1987, at 44. That figure is expected to
grow to $200 million by 1990. Compu Chem Laboratories, Inc., an environmental testing firm with a drug testing unit, experienced a growth in total revenue from $8 million in 1983, to $7.9 million in 1984, and $13.6 million in 1985. Id. Compu Chem
services 22 of the top 250 Fortune 500 companies. Id.
41. See Englade, supra note 20, at 22. A new product developed by Keystone
Diagnostic KDI Quick Test of Columbus, Md., is a chemically treated paper that
changes colors when exposed to urine sample containing drugs. Seller, supra note 40,
at 45.
42. See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 426. The Enzyme Multiplied Immonoassay
Technique (EMIT) is designed to detect THC and other cannabinoid metabolites.
The system utilizes a cutoff limit to differentiate positive from negative samples
based upon concentration levels of the metabolites. Two tests are commercially available. The EMIT-st (sing test) contains a compact spectrophotometer suitable for
small laboratory and office use. The EMIT d.a.u. (drugs of abuse in urine) was
designed for higher volume laboratory use.
The system works in the following manner. THC metabolites become chemically
attached to an enzyme. The enzyme-labeled drug then becomes attached chemically
to an antibody against the drug, which reduces the activity of the enzyme. This activity level is then measured. The test does not measure concentration levels in the
urine, but enzyme activity which correlates with concentration levels. Schwartz and
Haws, Laboratory Detection of Marijuana Use, 254 J.A.M.A. 788 (1985). Lyva's
EMIT process drug test costs a minimum of $15.00 to administer. Seller, supra note
40, at 44.
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however, dispute the claims of drug test manufacturers and question
the accuracy of the products.' s Recently developed saliva tests and
brain wave tests to detect substance abuse were marketed without
proof of their accuracy." Marijuana intoxication tests have been
found so sensitive that an individual's passive inhalation of marijuana smoke may indicate a positive test result if the cut-off limit is

set too low.45

Between 1972 and 1981, the Centers for Disease Control' conducted a blind study of thirteen laboratories examining the reliability of screening urine for drugs.'7 The researchers studied two error
43. Englade, supra note 20, at 22-23. The plaintiffs in Shield Club v. City of
Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986), challenged the positive results of
EMIT assays, radio immuno assays, and gas chromatography/mass spectometry confirmation tests which were administered to police cadets. Id. at 276. The plaintiffs
advanced the novel argument that the positive results were racially discriminatory.
Id. at 277. The plaintiffs supported their argument with an affidavit from a toxicologist which stated that melanin, a bodily substance that creates skin color, closely' resembles the composition of cannabinoids when excreted in the urine. Id. Since certain
minorities possess more melanin, their urinalysis drug tests are more likely to turn up
positive. Id. The court denied the toxicologist access to the defendant city's drug test
data during discovery because the toxicologist produced no data or evidence to support the validity of his hypothesis. Id. at 283-85.
For a debate concerning the validity and reliability of urinalysis drug tests and
polygraph tests, see Lykken, The Validity of Tests: Caveat Emptor, 27 JURIMETRICS
263 (1987); Raskin and Kircher, The Validity of Lykken's Criticisms: Fact or Fancy?,
27 JURIMETRics 271 (1987); Lykken, Reply to Raskin and Kircher, 27 JURIMETRICS
278 (1987).
44. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 426.
45. Five healthy volunteers who never smoked marijuana were exposed to cannabis smoke in a small, closed car for 30 minutes. Moreland, Bugge, Skuterud, Steen,
Wethe, Kjeldsen, Cannabinoidsin Blood Urine After Passive Inhalationof Cannibis
Smoke, 30 J. FORENSIC Sci. 997 (1985). Other subjects smoked marijuana or hashish
cigarettes while the experimental subjects passively inhaled the smoke. Id. The THC
concentrations in the cigarettes were controlled. Id. at 998.
The researchers analyzed the subjects' blood samples by gas chromatographylmass spectrometry (GC/MS), with the cutoff limit set at 0.5 ng/ml. Id. at
998. Blood and urine samples were analyzed by a radioimmunoassay (RIA) technique,
with the cutoff limit set at 13 ng/ml. Id. The researchers analyzed urine specimens
using the EMIT test kit. Id.
Although there was some individual variation, the results indicated the presence
of THC in blood samples and the presence of cannabinoid metabolites in the blood
and urine of the passive inhalers. Id. at 1000. Examining the EMIT analysis, the
researchers found positive values for three days following passive inhalation. The
study concluded that the presence of cannabinoid metabolites in blood or urine does
not unequivocally prove that the subject was actively smoking marijuana. Id. See also
Zeidenberg, Bourdon, and Nahas, Marijuana Intoxication by Passive Inhalation:
Documentation by Detection of Urinary Metabolites, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 76
(1977) (cannabinoids detected in urine of one nonsmoker living with five active marijuana smokers). But see Perez-Reyes, DiGuiseppi, Mason, and Davis, Passive Inhalation of Marijuana Smoke and Urinary Excretion of Cannabinoids, 34 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 36 (1983) (78 of 80 urine samples from passive
inhalation subjects tested negative for cannabinoids);
46. The Centers for Disease Control is an agency of the Department of Health
and Human Services.
47. Hansen, Caudill, and Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253 J.A.M.A. 2382
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rates."' The first rate measured false positives, where test results indicated that targeted drugs were present in the urine sample when
the sample was actually drug free. 4'9 The second rate measured false
negatives, where test results indicated no presence of the targeted
drug when the sample actually contained the targeted drug.50
Because laboratories test drug samples under controlled conditions,"1 the high error rate for laboratory drug test raises serious
questions regarding the accuracy of drug screens in the uncontrolled
environment of the workplace. Test results may be rendered virtually useless5 2 due to improper administration of the test, contamination, mishandling or sabotage.5 "
In addition to the inaccuracy and unreliability of drug test results, public-sector drug screening programs raise significant legal issues. Constitutional challenges to drug-screening programs are
raised concerning of whether public sector drug test programs violate the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
III.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

A. ProceduralDue Process
The fourteenth amendment procedural due process clause protects individuals from intrusive state action."' For an individual em(1985).
48. Id. at 2383-84.
49. Id. Cold medicines such as Contact and Sudafed can create false positives
for amphetamines, cough medicines such as dextromethorphan can create false positives for morphine use, and the prescription antibiotic amoxicillin, can create false
positives for cocaine use. Rust, supra note 36, at 51.
50. The error rates were: amphetamines, 0-37% false positives, 19-100% false
negatives; barbiturates, 0-6% false positives, 11-94% false negatives; cocaine, 0-6%
false positives, 0-100% false negatives; codeine, 0-7% false positives, 0-100% false
negatives; methadone, 0-66% false positives, 0-33% false negatives; morphine, 0-10%
false positives, 5-100% false negatives. Hansen, supra note 47, at 2383-84.
51. See, e.g., Schwartz, Hayden, and Riddile, Laboratory Detection of Mari-

juana Use, 139 AM. J. OF

DISEASE IN CHILDREN

1093 (1985), for a discussion of experi-

mental laboratory methodology.
52. See, Rothstein, supra note 5, at 27, for a satirical view of workplace drug
tests.
53. Id.
54. The relevant part of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Initially, the Supreme Court strictly interpreted state action. See The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Supreme Court later expanded the state action
concept to include racial discrimination. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1983);
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960), for a discussion
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ployee to establish a fourteenth amendment claim, an employer's invasion must be considered state action. Individuals are entitled to
adequate notice and hearing before the government deprives them
of rights or interests to which they have a "legitimate claim of entitlement."5 5 Individuals have legitimate claims of entitlement to
property rights.5 Because employment is a property right,5 7 employees are entitled to adequate notice and hearing before the public
sector employer can terminate employment." Termination without
notice and hearing would be an arbitrary and capricious deprivation
of an employee's property interest."
Once entitlement to due process is established, courts must consider the appropriate type and amount of procedural protection. In
Matthews v. Eldridge," the Supreme Court balanced three factors
to determine the type and amount of procedural due process necessary to satisfy the fourteenth amendment. The first factor was the
nature of the private interest affected."2 The second factor was the
risk that the actual governmental procedures would be employed erroneously, depriving an individual of his interest, as well as the
probable value of additional safeguards. 8 The third factor was the
governmental interest.6 4 Jones v. McKenzie, 5 a federal district
court case illustrates the interplay of these factors.
In Jones, a school bus attendant was terminated after a single,
of the state action requirement.
55. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (legitimate claims of
entitlement protect property rights).

56. Id.

57. Id. at 576-78 (professor's property interest in his employment defined by his
appointment). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491 (1985)
(school district employees possessed property interest in their continued employment). See also Closen, Connor, Kaufman, and Wojcik, Aids: Testing Democracy IrrationalResponses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 890 (1986) (employees have legitimate
claims to property rights, such as a job). The Supreme Court, in Perry v. Sinderman,
stated: "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process pruposes if there are ... rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
of entitlement to the benefit." 408 U.S. 598, 601. (1979). A contract, statute, ordinance, or employer policy may entitle an employee to procedural due process. Closen,
supra, at 889.
58. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D.D.C. 1986).
59. Id. at 1504.
60. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due"); Johnson
v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (determining what process is due
depends on weighing the benefit the person is deprived of, the need for efficient governmental action, and procedural safeguards present). See generally J. NOWAK, supra
note 54, 554-78, for a discussion of the procedures required by due process.
61. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
62. Id. at 335.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C 1986).
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unconfirmed urinalysis drug test indicated marijuana use." The
court reasoned that the employee had a property interest in her
job.67 The court held that termination of the attendant without a
proper hearing was, therefore, an arbitrary and capricious deprivation of the employee's property interest in her job."
As evidenced in Jones, a government employer drug screening
program has direct effects on an employee's private rights, affecting
the employee's property interest in his/her employment. Government employers who implement drug screening programs may capriciously and arbitrarily deprive employees of the property interest in
their jobs if they terminate employees whose test results indicate an
unconfirmed false positive. The government does, however, have a
substantial interest in maintaining a safe and secure work environment for employees. Balancing the nature of the employee's due
process rights and the risk of governmental procedures unconstitutionally depriving the employee of these rights leads to one conclusion. An employer cannot arbitrarily or capriciously deprive a public-sector employee of his job without fulfilling the due process
requirements of notice and fair hearing mandated by the fourteenth
amendment.
B. Substantive Due Process
The plaintiff in Jones v. McKenzie" also raised a substantive
due process argument. The court, however, decided the case on procedural due process grounds and did not consider the merits of the
substantive due process contentions. The substantive due process
question, therefore, remains to be litigated.
The separation of powers doctrine allows a government employer to act or implement rules and regulations with "minimal" judicial scrutiny. 0 The government employer's action, however, must
be "rationally related" to a "legitimate" public purpose. 71 If the gov66. Id. at 1503. The employee argued that the employer's termination, without
a hearing, was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of her constitutional rights
guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1501.
67. Id. at 1507.
68. Id. at 1507-08. The court reasoned that termination based upon a single,
unconfirmed, positive urinalysis was irrational. Id, at 1506. The court said that additional corroboration was necessary to confirm the results. Id. at 1507. The court also
stated that the employee's discharge without a pre-termination hearing deprived her

of due process rights. Id. At a minimum, due process requires that, before termination, the adversarial process between employer and employee must determine that

the employee is the subject of a positive test and that the positive test was appropriately confirmed. Id. at 1506. For a description of the Jones case, see Drug Test Limits, 72 A.B.A.J. 87 (1986).
69. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
70. See J. NOWAK, supra note 54, at 443-53; Closen, supra note 57, at 891-92.
71. J. NOWAK, supra note 54, at 443; See Closen, supra note 57, at 891.
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ernment employer's action infringes upon an employee's fundamental rights, the employer must justify the infringement as "necessary"
72
to serving "compelling" governmental interest.
Public-sector employers argue that although drug testing infringes upon employee rights such as privacy and employment, the
testing is necessary to serve the "compelling" governmental interests
of employee safety and public safety. Employees counter that other
methods, such as performance tests, are the appropriate means to
serve the legitimate public purposes of employee safety and public
safety. The argument yet to be litigated is whether mass and random drug tests violate the fourteenth amendment's substantive due
process requirement.

IV. MASS AND RANDOM DRUG SCREENING PROGRAMS VIOLATE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES

An employer's fulfillment of due process requirements does not
settle the controversy. The most cogent argument an employee can
raise against mandatory mass or random urinalysis drug testing is
that such programs are a search and seizure in violation of fourth
amendment rights.7 3 Courts, however, have provided little guidance
72. See J. NOWAK, supra note 54, at 443-52. See also Closen, supra note 57, at
892. The Supreme Court has held that the rights to employment, education, and
housing are not fundmental rights. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982). Id.
73. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Leslie Johnson, Director of Public Information of the American Civil Liberties
Unions, stated emphatically that drug screening is an invasion of privacy. Telephone
interview with Leslie Johnson, Director of Public Information of the American Civil
Liberties Union (Sept. 16, 1986). Drug tests may reveal things which aA employer has
no right to know. Id. For example, the results may indicate whether an employee is
pregnant or has a venereal disease. Id.
Furthermore, the results of the drug tests do not necessarily correlate with job
performance. Id. An employee who takes drugs over the weekend may not be impaired in his/her job performance, even though trace amounts of the substance may
be detected in the urine. Id. Since Americans are innocent until proven guilty, employers should be required to show that the employee was intoxicated on duty or that
job performance was impaired. Id. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Probable cause, therefore, is the standard required before
implementation of drug testing. Id.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) issues a pamphlet which describes
mass and random urinalysis drug testing as a violation of fourth amendment rights.
American Civil Liberties Union, Drug Testing in the Workplace (1986). The ACLU
contends that employees have a right to be left alone and that the tests can disclose
numerous details concerning an individual's private life. Id. The ACLU further attacked the tests' reliability and their inability to measure impairment or intoxication.
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to employees in establishing a consistent standard of fourth amendment protection. An examination of the fourth amendment and of
recent cases illustrates this point.
The fourth amendment protects an individual from unreasonable state intrusions.7 ' Courts weigh the government's need to search
and seize against the individual's expectation of privacy in the area
searched and in the items seized. 7" Courts engage in this balancing
to determine whether the individual actually possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the governmental intrusions are
justified."
Fourth amendment protection extends only to those areas
where an individual has a "legitimate expectation of privacy."' 7 A
legitimate expectation of privacy encompasses more than an individId. The ACLU asserted that three conditions must be met before employers may test
employees for drugs:
1. The employer has reason to believe that the employee's faculties are impaired on the job;
2. The employee's impairment presents danger to his own safety or the safety
of others;
3. The employer gives the employee the opportunity, at the employer's expense, to have the sample tested by an independent laboratory and gives
the employee an opportunity to rebut or explain the results.
Id.
74. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in invaded place); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (fourth
amendment protects person, places and things from unreasonable searches where an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
1826, 1834 (1966) (fourth amendment protects individual privacy and dignity from
unwarranted state intrusion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (core of fourth
amendment is security of privacy against arbitrary state intrusion); McDonell v.
Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (1985) (fourth amendment protects people, places
and things from state invasion where individual has reasonable expectation of privacy); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. App. 1985)
(reasonable expectation of privacy protects against unreasonable state intrusions).
See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979) (prisoners still retain some reasonable expectation of privacy).
75. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (need for particular search balanced against invasion of personal rights); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
534-35 (1967) (need for particular search balanced against invasion of personal
rights); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.C.N.J. 1985) (test of reasonableness balances need of seizure against personal rights); (courts weigh need to
seize against invasion seizure entails). See Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 821
cert. dismissed, 353 U.S. 952 (1957) (whether the seizure is fundamentally unfair or
unreasonable when balanced against the affected private right).
76. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985). See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 54, at 734-64, for a
general discussion of constitutionally protected privacy rights.
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan said: "[Tihere is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have established an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. See Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1, 7 (1977);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp.
1089, 1098-99 (D.N.J. 1985).
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ual's subjective privacy expectation." The expectations are defined
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.79 For example, a burglar breaking into a victim's home has a subjective expectation of privacy,"0 but the law does not recognize this
expectation as legitimate or reasonable."' Conversely, a property
owner has a legally recognized expectation of privacy in his property, allowing him to exclude others from his property.8 "
The context in which the privacy right is asserted shapes the
individual's privacy expectation. 3 What is considered a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one context may not be considered reasonable in another. 4 In reference to the public- sector employment context, the Reagan Administration contends that government employees in "sensitive" or "critical" positions should submit to drug
tests.8 This assumes that employees in these job classifications do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to disposing
of urine. To fully understand the significance of this assertion, the
issue of whether urinalysis, within the context of public employer
drug testing, constitutes a search and seizure must be examined.
Public-sector employers who require employees to submit to
mandatory urinalysis drug tests are conducting searches as defined
8
under the fourth amendment. In Schmerber v. California,"
the
United States Supreme Court held that compulsory administration
of a blood test upon an unwilling subject fell within the purview of
the fourth amendment.8 7 The Court held that such a test clearly
constituted a search for fourth amendment purposes.88 Using the
Schmerber analysis, other courts have held that breathalyzer tests
are searches for fourth amendment purposes.8 9 Finally, courts ex78. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (privacy shaped by asserted
context); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)("specific content and incidents of [fourth
amendent rights] must be shaped by the context in which [they are] asserted");
United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2nd Cir. 1984) (privacy shaped by
asserted context); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir
1975) (privacy interests shaped by context in which they are asserted); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. App. 1985) (privacy interests shaped
by context in which they are asserted).
84. Committee for G.I. Rights, 518 F.2d at 476 ("what is reasonable in one context may not be reasonable in another"); Turner, 500 A.2d at 1007 (reasonableness of
privacy expectations varies with the context).
85. Thomas, supra note 1, at 60.
86. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
87. Id. at 767.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980) (taking blood, breath, and
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tended the Schmerber reasoning, holding that urinalysis drug tests
constitute fourth amendment searches. 90
The United States Supreme Court, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,9 held that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se under
the fourth amendment unless conducted under a few specific and
well-delineated circumstances. 92 Public-sector employers who require mandatory urinalysis drug tests for employees or prospective
employees do not possess search warrants. An employee has grounds
to challenge a public sector employer's mass or random drug screening program as a unreasonable per se warrantless search.
Government employers who implement mass or random urinalysis drug screening programs are also conducting warrantless
searches for fourth amendment purposes. In reaction to increased
absenteeism, poor work performance, and safety problems related to
drug abuse, employers justify administration of the urinalysis drug
tests as necessary to enhance employee productivity and safety. Additionally, employers believe that drug screening will deter employee
drug usage."
In Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v.
Suscy, 94 a union challenged an employer's rule requiring bus drivers
to submit to blood and urine tests when they are involved in a serious accident, are suspected of being intoxicated on duty, or are
under the influence of narcotics.9 s When faced with the employees'
fourteenth amendment challenge, the seventh circuit held that a
urine samples is fourth amendment search and seizure); State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849,
391 A.2d 107 (1978) (breathalyzer examination constitutes fourth amendment
search).
90. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986) (taking urine and
testing it for drugs is a search); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (urinalysis is a fourth amendment search); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.
Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1985) (urinalysis testing for use of controlled substances is a
fourth amendment search); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)(litigants agreed urinalysis was a fourth amendment search). See Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976)
(union argued deprivation of fourth amendment rights for making bus drivers submit
to urinalysis); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985)
(urinalysis drug tests violate fourth amendment without reasonable suspicion); Davis
v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1968) (urinalysis without cause violates
fourth amendment); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (urine testing of police and firefighters warranted under reasonable suspicion
standard).
91. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
92. Id. at 455. The court stated that "[tihe exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn', and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Id.
93. Applicants with traces of drugs in their urine will not be hired. Englade,
supra note 20, at 21-22. Employees who test positive for drug usage are disciplined by
suspension or firing.
94. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 1265-66.
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government employer must only show that the rule is reasonable.

6

In examining the fourth amendment issue in Suscy, the court
held that probable cause existed and no warrant was necessary when
public interest justified the employer's intrusion.9 7 In this decision,
the court redefined probable cause to include suspicion, when public
safety interests were balanced against individual privacy interests.

The court arbitrarily expanded the scope of probable cause without
defining the limits of the concept. Thus, the court abrogated the employees' legitimate fourth and fourteenth amendment rights and
created a vacuum, where no uniform guidelines or standards exist.
5
In Allen v. City of Marietta"
the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia balanced the employee's legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's right to oversee the employees and to investigate misconduct, and concluded
that urinalysis drug tests are not unreasonable searches in violation

96. Id. at 1266. In turning to the fourth amendment issue, the court examined
whether the bus driver had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 1267. The
court balanced this claim against the public's interest and decided that a government
agency can place reasonable conditions on public employment. Id. The court said
that the employer had a paramount interest in protecting the public and that, under
the circumstances stated in the rules, the bus drivers had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in regard to submitting blood and urine samples. Id.
97. Id. In holding that the employer's rules complied with fourth amendment
standards, the court stated, "the public interest in the safety of mass transit riders
outweighs any individual interest in refusing to disclose physical evidence of intoxication or drug abuse. Id. Employees who do not comply with the employer's rules may
be terminated. Id.
98. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). In this case, six former employees sued
the city after being terminated. Id. at 484. A city official received reports from various
sources that certain employees were using drugs on the job. Id. The official believed
because of the hazardous type of employment, on the job substance abuse constituted
a significant threat to employee and public safety. Id.
After an undercover investigation, the city official informed the six employees
that they would be terminated unless they submitted to urinalysis drug testing. Id.
All of the employees tested positive for marijuana metabolites. Id. The city subsequently terminated all six employees. Id. at 484-85.
In the ensuing litigation, the employees asserted that the urinalysis constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of fourth amendment rights. Id. at
485. The employees were not granted a hearing before termination. The employees
also asserted that the termination was an arbitrary and capricious deprivation of
their employment property interest, in violation of due process rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. Id.
Examining the search and seizure issue, the court applied the Schmerber analysis
and noted that expulsion of urine is qualitatively different from the extraction of
blood. Id. at 488. The court then noted cases which extended the Schmerber analysis
to include breathlyzer tests and urine tests. Id. at 488-89. Based on the findings of
other courts, the Allen court held that urinalysis is a fourth amendment search. Id. at
489.
The court then sought to determine whether the search was unreasonable. Id. at
489-90. The court noted that the government employer, in utilizing a urinalysis drug
test, conducted a warrantless search. Id. at 489. The court examined cases which decided the warrantless search issue. Id. at 489-90.
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of fourth amendment rights. 9 The court cited two factors in determining that the searches were reasonable: (1) the urinalysis was conducted in an employment context and had no law enforcement purpose, and (2) the city had a right to conduct warrantless searches
because the employees were engaged in hazardous work, where onthe-job substance abuse could adversely affect employee and public
safety.'
In Allen, the employer took reasonable steps to investigate the
allegations of employee misconduct. The employer gathered enough
evidence constituting probable cause before the employees were required to submit to urinalysis drug testing. The court correctly
noted that the employer did not violate the employee's fourth
amendment rights. The court, however, failed to articulate a drug
test standard to guide future litigants.
Similarly, in McDonell v. Hunter,'0' the district court held unconstitutional an Iowa Department of Corrections policy which required employees to submit to searches of their vehicles and persons, including blood tests and urinalysis.'0 2 Evaluating the
reasonableness of the seizure in the place of employment context' 01
the court held that the administration's intrusions are only justified
by reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the employees
were engaging in substance abuse. 0 4 In this case, the court concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed.'0 5
The McDonell court established reasonable suspicion as a constitutional guideline for government employers investigating employee misconduct. The court found that probable cause was an inappropriate standard because it applies only to criminal
proceedings. The court held that employers who institute drug testing upon mere suspicion or no grounds at all are violating the employees' fourth amendment rights. Reasonable suspicion, therefore,
99. Id. at 491.
100. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. The court then considered whether the employees were denied procedural due process rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. After determining that the employees had a property interest in their jobs,
the court reasoned that they could not be deprived of employment without due process. Id. Following the firing, the employees were offered a post-termination review by
the pension board. Id. at 493. Each employee received a notice citing the reason for
termination and a list of witnesses prepared to testify against them. Id. The court
concluded that these procedures were sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 494.
101. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D.C. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (1987). (the
court of appeals permitted testing that is performed "uniformly or by systematic random selection of those employees who have regular contact with the prisoners on a
day-to-day basis in medium or maximum security prisons.")
102. Id. at 1131.
103. Id. at 1128.
104. Id. at 1130.
105. Id. at 1131.
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is a logical, constitutionally sound standard which fills the vacuum
between probable cause and mere suspicion.
In Shoemaker v. Handel,106 the court essentially weighed the
legitimate governmental interest in maintaining the integrity of the
horse racing industry and ensuring the safety of the participants
against the jockey's legitimate expectations of privacy.107 The court
concluded that the jockeys have a diminished expectation of privacy
because the state heavily regulates the racing industry. 08 The court
held that the jockeys must submit to the tests because the reasonable suspicion standard did not apply.' 0 s
The court distinguished its holding in Shoemaker from the
holding in McDonell.1 0 The court noted that in McDonell, the government's objective was to discover drug smuggling." 1 The court
considered this objective an attentuated goal." 2 Shoemaker, on the
other hand, involved an industry which the state regulated."
The court in Shoemaker reached an erroneous conclusion. The
"attentuated" goal referred to in McDonell is virtually the same goal
as the drug testing program goal in Shoemaker: to eliminate drug
abuse. The regulation of an industry does not supply a rational basis
justifying violation of an employee's fourth amendment rights.
In McDonell, prison employees' rights were the focus of the litigation. Prisons are also subject to regulation, yet the McDonell
court established reasonable suspicion as an appropriate standard
before employers can conduct searches. Two other cases illustrate
the establishment of the reasonable suspicion standard for employees in regulated job classifications.
In Turner v. FraternalOrder of Police,"4 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia found that individuals possess different
expectations of privacy depending upon the context in which the expectations are asserted." 5 The Turner court adopted the reasonable
106.

619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985).

107. Id. at 1100.
108. Id. at 1102.
109. Id. at 1102-03.
110. For a discussion of McDonell and Shoemaker, see Feerick, Employees
Rights and Substance Abuse, 195 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
111. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1102-03 (D.C.N.J. 1985).
112. Id.
113. Id. The court then examined the privacy issue which the jockeys raised. Id.
at 1105-07. The court noted that individuals have an interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters. Id. at 1106. The Racing Commission, the court stated, ensured that the jockey's breathalyzer and urine test records would remain confidential
and would ultimately be destroyed. Id. at 1107.
114. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985).
115. Id. at 1007-08. The Chief of Police issued a special order directed at elimi-

nating drug abuse on the Department. Id. at 1006. The order provided that any Department official could order any member of the police force to submit to urinalysis
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suspicion standard for a job classification that is public safety related and critical. In balancing employer and employee interests, the
court reached a rational, constitutionally sound compromise. The
reasonable suspicion standard for specific job classifications, such as
police officers, not only provides guidance for employers seeking to
implement drug testing programs, but also provides fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to
employees.
In City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,'" a Florida appellate court
reversed the trial court's finding that probable cause must be established before employers could require employees to submit urine
samples. 1 7 The court found this standard too strict." 8 The more appropriate standard, the court held, was the reasonable suspicion
standard." 9 The reasonable suspicion test requires employers to justify urinalysis drug testing by identifying specific objective facts and
the rational inferences which may be drawn from those facts, leading employers to believe that employees are engaging in drug
based upon a suspicion of drug abuse. Id. The order also provided that the Department could terminate any member who refused to submit a urine sample for drug
testing. Id. The Department used the EMIT Cannabinoid assay, which detects the
presence of the psychoactive chemical that produces the intoxicating effect. Id. at
1006 n.2. The test can detect the presence of the chemical for a period of seven or
more days after use. Id.
One Department member, and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the Department's union, filed a complaint, seeking an injuction against urinalysis drug testing.
Id. at 1006. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction. Id. In finding for the
plaintiffs, the trial court held that the order violated the Department member's
fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id. at 1006-07.
On the police chief's appeal, the court considered whether the fourth amendment
allowed the Department to force police officers, suspected of drug abuse, to submit to
urinalysis drug testing. Id. at 1007. In addressing this issue, the court initially considered whether police officers have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their person
which outweighs the Department's need for intrusion upon that privacy in order to
advance the goals of public and Departmental safety. Id. The court cited the holding
in Committee for G.I. Right v. Calloway, 518 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1975) as an example.
Id. at 1007-08. The court noted that, because of conditions peculiar to the military
and the nature of its mission, military personnel, therefore, have less fourth amendment protection than civilians. Id.
116. 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
117. Id. at 1325-26. The city appealed a final judgment which permanently enjoined it from conducting random urinalysis drug tests of police officers and firefighters. Id. at 1323. The trial court held that the drug tests constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure, in violation of the employees' fourth amendment rights. Id. at
1325. The court stated that the probable cause must exist before the city would require urinalysis drug tests of employees. Id.
118. Id. at 1325. Due to the hazardous nature of the police officers' and
firefighters' work, the court said that the city had a right to develop a policy forbidding substance abuse. Id. at 1326. The city's concern is genuine because of the potential danger to the employee and the public which exists if the employee uses illicit
drugs. Id. This policy could prohibit drug use at any time, whether the use is on or off
the job. Id.
119. Id.
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abuse. 2 '
The City of Palm Bay court also adopted the reasonable suspicion standard for employees in critical or safety related job classifications. The court not only adopted this standard, but also elaborated upon the concept in order to provide more guidance to
employers wishing to establish drug testing programs. Employers,
therefore, will be able to protect both their own interests and the
public's interests without unduly infringing employees' fourth
amendment rights.
The district court in Capua v. City of Plainfield12 ' utilized the
reasonable suspicion standard to hold that mass urinalysis drug
screening of fire fighters and police was an unreasonable violation of
fourth amendment rights.122 The court said that a public sector employer's reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific facts and
upon all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.1 23 These facts
must then be individualized to an employee targeted for a search.1 2
Without such individualized suspicion, the court held, the fourth
amendment could
not protect employees from arbitrary governmen25
tal intrusion.1

The Capua court reached a correct, constitutionally sound decision in holding that the city's mass urinalysis drug testing program
was an unreasonable intrusion upon employees' privacy interest.
The court added the concept of individualized suspicion to the reasonable suspicion standard. A public sector employer thus, may justifiably test an employee manifesting objective symptomology of on
the job drug use.
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,26 the district court held
120. Id. The court explained that reasonable suspicion is less than probable
cause, but more than mere suspicion. Id. Reasonable suspicion must have factual support in the surrounding circumstances. Id. Reasonable suspicion requires further investigation. Id. Where reasonable suspicion exists, urinalysis is an appropriate investigating tool. Id. For a discussion of City of Palm Bay, Drug Testing: Reasonable
Suspicion Required, 72 A.B.A.J. 20 (1986).
121. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
122. Id. at 1517.
123. Id.
124. Id. The court determined that a "reasonable" search and seizure is defined
by the context of the search. Id. at 1513. The drug testing program subjected employees to a high degree of bodily intrusion without any specific facts or information that
any employee had been taking drugs. Id. at 1514-16. The court stated that "[the
invidious effect of such mass, round-up urinalysis is that it casually sweeps up the
innocent with the guilty and willingly sacrifices each individual's fourth amendment
rights." Id. at 1517. Since firefighters and police are under constant observation by
superiors and co-workers, the court reasoned that an individualized, reasonable suspicion could be established by manifestation of symptoms. Id. at 1518.
125. Id. at 1517. The court also found that the mass urinalysis drug testing programs infringed upon the employees' constitutionally protected liberty and property
interests because the employees were deprived of due process. Id. at 1521.
126. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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that the employer must have reasonable suspicion that a urinalysis
drug test will provide evidence that a firefighter is using illegal
drugs. 12 7 The court said that reasonableness is determined by balancing the employer's need to search against the employee's reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. 2 ' The court found that
the state had a compelling interest in drug testing.129 When balanced against the employee's privacy interests, however, the court
held that the employer's interest was limited and therefore the employer must have an individualized suspicion that an employee is
ingesting illicit drugs.' 30 The court defined this individualized suspicion as "reasonable suspicion."' 3'
In Penny v. Kennedys 2 the companion case to Lovvorn, police
officers sought an injunction preventing the Commissioner of Fire
and Police from conducting a mass urinalysis drug testing program. 33 The court found, on facts similar to Lovvorn, that the city
had no reasonable suspicion to justify conducting the drug test program. " 4 The court referred to the reasoning in Lovvorn to explain
its decision.' "
In Lovvorn and Penny, the court used precedent " "' to reach a
reasonable, constitutionally sound decision. The court also used
Capua's137 concept of individualized suspicion to define reasonable
suspicion. This individualized, reasonable suspicion standard, when
linked to objective facts which a public-sector employer possesses,
provides adequate constitutional safeguards to protect both society's
safety interests and employees' privacy interests.
127. Id. at 880. The court also determined that firefighters have property interests in their jobs and liberty interests in their reputations which cannot be taken
without due process. Id. at 883.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. Since firefighters engage in hazardous work and must be able to make
snap decisions and react quickly, the city has compelling interest in having drug-free
firefighters. Id.
130. Id. at 880. The court noted that the city did not possess any objective facts
about any individual employees, such as deficient job performance or physical or
mental deficiencies, in order to establish a reasonable suspicion of illicit drug usage.
Id. at 882.
131. Id. at 880.
132. 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
133. Id. at 816.
134. Id. at 817.
135. Id.
136. In reaching its decision, the court relied specifically upon the holdings in
Capua v. The City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986), Jones v. McKenzie,
628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa
1985), Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985), City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,
475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers
v. Bd of Educ., 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Caruso v. Ward, 506
N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
137. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
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In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 3 ' the
district court concluded that a proposed urinalysis drug testing program for employees seeking promotion was an unreasonable and
wholly unconstitutional search and seizure.139 The court noted that
the United States Customs Service lacked probable cause, or even
reasonable suspicion, to conduct "dragnet" searches and seizures. 40
The court, therefore, held that the drug testing program violated
employees' fourth amendment rights, unconstitutionally interfered
with employees' penumbral rights of privacy, and violated fifth
amendment protections against self-incrimination.""
After considering the fourth amendment issue, the court correctly held that the public-sector employer's drug testing program
constituted a fourth amendment search and seizure, violating the
employees' legitimate expectations of privacy. The court, enjoining
the drug testing program on privacy and fifth amendment grounds,
went further than other courts, which have held such programs unconstitutional solely on fourth amendment grounds. Because penumbral rights of privacy and fifth amendment self-incrimination issues in drug testing cases are largely unlitigated, it is unlikely that
other courts will follow the Von Raab court's reasoning.
A

PROPOSED DRUG TESTING STANDARD FOR PUBLIC-SECTOR
EMPLOYEES

As the previously-discussed cases demonstrate, the context in
which an individual asserts a reasonable expectation of privacy is
the crucial factor that courts consider when determining the degree
of fourth amendment protection. To date, courts have held that
jockeys, military personnel, and government employees in hazardous
work, or in work directly related to public safety, possess diminished
expectations of privacy regarding urinalysis drug testing. In the various rulings, however, courts have not formulated consistent or rational standards applicable in a variety of contexts and circumstances. As a result of balancing employers' interests and public
interests against employees' interests, the courts have arbitrarily
drawn lines between fourth amendment protection and an employer's right to intrude upon an employee's privacy.
As indicated in McDonell,42 Turner4 3 City of Palm Bay,""
138. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), modified, 808 F.2d 1051 (1981).
139. Id. at 387.
140. Id. Although the court found the employer's interest in a drug-free work
place and work force legitimate, the court found the means used to reach this goal
violated employees' fourth amendment rights. Id.
141. Id. at 387-89.

142. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Iowa 1985).
143. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985).
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Capua,'4 5 Lovvorn," s Penny," ' and Von Raab," s public-sector employers can develop a drug-testing policy that will withstand constitutional scrutiny in the courts. Initially, government employers must
delineate the goals and purposes which a drug testing program will
serve. The primary purpose of urinalysis drug testing is to protect
the health of the employees and the public. " 9 Regulations of the
Food and Drug Administration and criminal laws against drugs
prove that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting public
health.
Government employers promulgate many rules for the express
purpose of protecting employee and public safety. A urinalysis drug
testing program is a logical extension of these safety rules. Any drug
testing program should contain a written statement of goals and
objectives which clearly and explicitly state that the drug testing
program was enacted to protect employee and public health.
In developing a drug testing policy which will survive the fourteenth amendment, public sector employers must adopt standards
which are "rationally related" to legitimate state objectives.' " Primarily, this means that drug testing policies must provide sanctions
only against those employees who are found to be using drugs which
adversely affect job performance, and which, in turn, adversely affect employee or public safety.
A standardized testing procedure is the second attribute of a
drug testing policy which would withstand fourteenth amendment
scrutiny.' 5' The testing procedure should be standardized, raising an
employee's expectation that urinalysis drug testing will occur only
when an employer has a reasonable suspicion that employees in
"sensitive" or safety related jobs are using drugs that affect their job
performance. The reasonable suspicion standard for employees in
"critical" or safety-related job classifications provides the employee
with fourth amendment protection preventing employers from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. The reasonable suspicion standard requires more than mere suspicion. Government employers must have some factual basis for requiring urinalysis.
Adoption of the reasonable suspicion standard in this context would
prevent employers from engaging in substance abuse "fishing
144. 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
145. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
146. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
147. 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
148. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
149. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text, for a discussion of substantive due process.
151. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying test, for a discussion of drug test
reliability.
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expeditions."

The probable cause standard is appropriate for public-sector
employees who are not in "critical" or safety-related job classifications. As the Allen"8 court stated, "Government employees do not
surrender their fourth amendment rights merely because they go to
work for the government. They have as much of a right to be free
from warrantless government searches as any other citizens."' 54 Requiring a lesser drug test standard for these employees would unconstitutionally violate their fourth amendment rights.
In addition to fourth amendment challenges, the drug testing
policy must provide minimal procedural safeguards before government employers impose sanctions. Mass and random urinalysis drug
testing may result in inaccuracies in isolated circumstances. Employees should be allowed to challenge the results or produce evidence explaining why they were using certain drugs. Certain drugs
used by employees may be necessary for valid medical reasons and
should not be sanctioned.
The government employers' discretion regarding the imposition
of penalties should also be reduced in a drug testing policy. Because
the policy primarily protects employee and public health, sanctioning guidelines consistent with this goal should be included in the
policy. The policy should require first-time offenders to undergo
drug treatment, rather than termination. 5 ' By concentrating on rehabilitation, as opposed to punishment, the sanctioning approach
would attempt to help the employee. Subsequent violations should
be dealt with in a progressively harsh manner, culminating in termination. Such a graduated sanctioning approach is both sensible and
constitutionally sound.
Finally, a constitutionally sound drug testing policy should not
infringe upon an employee's right to privacy. Employers should require each employee to sign a drug testing consent form. The consent form should fully apprise the employee of the prohibited drugs,
the test methodology, and the possible sanctions for violation of the
anti-drug policy. The consent form's purpose is twofold. First, it
protects employers from possible liability. Second, it protects employees by fully informing them of the anti-drug policy in detail.
152. A "fishing expedition" is when an employer searches for drug abuse among
employees without any grounds.
153. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

154. Id. at 491.
155. See Marmo, Alcoholism, Drug Addiction, and Mental Illness: The Use of
Rehabilitative Remedies in Arbitration, 32 LAB. L.J. 491 (1981) (advocating utiliza-

tion of rehabilitation rather than punitive measures in arbitration).
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CONCLUSION

Substance abuse in America is of critical concern to all citizens.
The impact of drug abuse in the workplace is tremendous in terms
of economic and societal costs. The occasional use of illicit drugs on
the job is especially dangerous for employees in "critical" or safetyrelated job classifications. Public-sector employers have acknowledged this potential danger by instituting mass and random drug
testing programs.
These drug testing programs, however, raise certain constitutional issues. Courts have held that the context in which an employee asserts a legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced
against the employer's interests and societal interests. The result
has been an inconsistent application of fourth amendment protections. Drug testing policy raises special problems which require
courts to adopt consistent standards so that employees may know in
advance the extent of their fourth amendment protections. Government employers should be aware of these problems. They should implement drug testing programs which reflect fairness toward employees and which are constitutionally sound.
Edward E. Westphal

